On August 2nd 2014 the Ashburton Guardian published an article
about local man Russell John Tully's desperate plight to find domestic accommodation
despite an overwhelming number of physical, economic, and political factors
stacked against him.[1]
A month later, on September 1st, he walked into Ashburton's Work and Income New
Zealand branch, killed two workers with a shotgun and critically injured a
third. He was apprehended later in the day and subsequently charged with the
murders.[2]
As of writing this essay Tully's defendants are still waiting a psychiatric
assessment on his mental state while he is remanded in custody. However,
given the desperate circumstances that led to this event, it would not be
implausible to hypothesise they contributed to, or exacerbated existing,
psychopathologies. Tully is suffering from a skin disease which has rendered
him unable to work, and had "come home to die", so was seeking
assistance to live out his untimely fate.[3]
In engaging with this event on a deeper level is not an apologist stance
towards Tully's actions, but attempting to understand the broader social,
political, and economic contexts of why such a tragedy could occur through the
lens of what Jürgen Habermas refers to as the colonisation of the lifeworld. I
will attempt to discern to what extent Habermas' theory is valid in this
specific circumstance. Firstly, I will offer an explanation of Habermas’ work
in his Theory of Communicative Action and
how this relates to the concept of the lifeworld. Secondly, I will trace the
concept of social evolution through to what Habermas refers to as
rationalisation of the lifeworld. Thirdly, I will discuss Habermas’ adaptation
of systems theory to provide an account for how the lifeworld becomes
colonised. Finally, for the remainder of the essay I will provide an
application of Habermas’ theory to the circumstances surrounding Tully’s
actions within the context of the modernisation and rationalisation of
societies.
Habermas' interpretation of critical social theory is grounded in his
theory of communicative action: communication between two or more people with
the intention of establishing meaningful social relationships.[4]
Communicative action, Habermas argues, is a form of action that transcends
other instrumental forms of social action in that "actors seek to reach an
understanding about the action and their plans of action in order to coordinate
their actions by way of agreement".[5]
Participants, through language, intersubjectively test each other's claims for
validity in order to reach understanding as opposed to reaching success.[6]
The process of communicative action "takes place against the background of
a culturally ingrained preunderstanding".[7]
This background, the lifeworld, a theory initially developed by Edmund Husserl
in the phenomenological tradition, and sociologically developed by Alfred Schütz,
is what Habermas draws upon for his account of how societies create and sustain
themselves.[8]
The lifeworld is a background of skills, knowledge, and competences that serves
to maintain social relationships, and communicative action is what serves to
reproduce the lifeworld "by way of the continuation of valid knowledge,
stabilisation of group solidarity, and socialisation of responsible
actors".[9]
Habermas has drawn upon Niklaus Luhmann's systems theory of sociology to
develop a social evolutionary explanation of the rationalisation of the
lifeworld (which I will discuss below). As societies evolve they become
increasingly complex, however, Habermas is not claiming this is an inevitable
process by way of differentiating institutional sub-systems out from the
lifeworld, but that humans within societies bring about these changes
themselves.[10]
What Habermas is attempting to do is engage with, and form a symbiosis of, two
different theoretical perspectives to form a more comprehensive analysis of
modern societies: systems theory developed by Luhmann and Talcott Parsons,
which discerns societies from the outside as a series of component systems,
including the lifeworld; and a participant perspective that encompasses a
"hermeneutic approach that picks up on members' pre-theoretical knowledge".[11]
Habermas is not casting off systems theory but merely advocating it with an
understanding that "what [fundametally] binds sociated individuals to one
another and secures the integration of society is a web of communicative
actions".[12]
It becomes important to conceptualise the rationalisation, and subsequent
colonisation, of the lifeworld in terms of both the social integration of
societies and the systems integration of societies.[13]
Social integration conceives of societies as "normatively guaranteed or
communicatively achieved", whereas systematically integrated societies use
"nonnormative steering of individual decisions [that are] not subjectively
coordinated".[14]
Max Weber referred to rationalisation as "the pillar of both the
modern State and of the economic life in the West", which has
differentiated societal systems so far that they have taken on an autonomy that
is no longer grounded in normative moral principles but their own inner workings.[15]
These autonomous institutions, although rooted in the lifeworld, "steer a
social intercourse that has been largely disconnected from norms and
values".[16]
This process is referred to by Habermas as the "uncoupling of the system
and lifeworld".[17]
Because of the increasing demands placed on language in complex societies an
overburden occurs that has the effect of differentiating out various modes of
exchange between systems: what Habermas refers to as "delinguistified
media"—specifically money and power.[18]
These institutional economic, bureaucratic, and political systems place demands
on society so much so that it becomes almost impossible to avoid conforming to
their dictates. This penetration of dehumanised systems, initially a product of
humanity's modernisation, into the process of social integration is what
Habermas argues is the colonisation of the lifeworld.
I will now turn to an application of Habermas’ theory to the surrounding
circumstances of Russell John Tully’s actions on September 1st 2014. Closer
inspection of modern society’s rationalistion reveals how institutions have
differentiated from the lifeworld what was once the domain of charitable groups
and communitarian concern.[19]
This is not to say poverty or unfortunate circumstances such as Tully’s did not
occur before the modernisation and industrialisation of society, but the
channels to ameliorate these circumstances were less institutionalised and
relied on the communicative action Harbermas suggests is integral for a
socially integrated society. Because of globalisation, increase in complex
technological communication, and population growth of the modern era,
especially later half of the twentieth century, the role of the socially
integrated community has vastly diminished and has been handed over to larger
political structures. Almost every facet of modern life adheres in some way or
another to larger systems that are devoid of communicative action. In a
hypothetical scenario of a socially integrated society one could place Tully
in, he might see his plight addressed by family members, friends, local
charitable organisations, church groups, even local community political
authorities (at least to some extent). With a modest amount of social resources
at hand and through a process of communicative action Tully’s needs could be
addressed more readily. Where appeals are dealt with through a smaller number
of channels that are socially integrated, the face-to-face deliberation would
yield at the very least tangible results.
While the emergence of the modern welfare state in New Zealand has meant
a greater and more equitable access to social assistance—and this has waxed and
waned depending on the ideological perspective of successive governments—it has
passed over this to institutions whereby communication is instrumentally
orientated rather than orientated toward mutual understanding. Applications for
unemployment, disability, or accommodation benefits have to adhere to a strict
set of criteria that has the result of very little impetus for providing
assistance, empathy, or discretion. Every social welfare client’s needs are
complex, yet the system treats them as a number, and fails to address pressing
concerns such as health issues or need for affordable accommodation—or even the
ability to discern potentially dangerous mental health issues. Social workers
at the coalface such as those murdered by Tully no doubt personally share some
psychological empathy towards their clients, yet they are ultimately bound by
guidelines dictated to them by the machinations of the bureaucracy that stands
above them. In the despondent eyes of Work and Income’s clients they are just
another part of a dehumanising system that they have no other choice but to
adhere to. These extraordinary pathologies may be indicative of a system so far
removed from the lifeworld that it is failing to engage and address its needs
in a meaningful and socially integrated manner.
The modern welfare state is just one of a myriad of systems “in which
the demands of communicative action are relaxed … within legally specified
limits”.[20]
This characteristic of bureaucracy is also shared by capitalist monetary
system, which Harbermas argues not only has the effect of regulating social
environments, but also absorbs the state apparatus so that “power becomes
assimilated to money”.[21]
This is the delinguistified media that Habermas argues has become the new
standard of exchange between systems. The state’s bureaucracies become steered by
markets as does every day social systems that we interact with. Evidence of
this can be seen when we analyse Tully’s circumstances in relation to the
market and state bureaucracies. The market determines if his labour will be
purchased by capital—which negatively affects the value of labour of those
disabled such as his—as well as directing the market-accepted value of welfare
assistance. Welfare policy is not determined by a mutual understanding of what
is a socially accepted level of socio-economic subsistence, but by autonomously
driven market forces (as well as hegemonically prevailing ideological
perspectives). Tully was also forced to orientate his actions towards the
autonomous real estate market in searching for accommodation; the quality and
availability of this was limited by his low income as dictated by the labour
market. This penetration and reification of the market system and bureaucracy so
far into determining every facet of our lives—both negatively and
positively—rather than communicative action is the concern Habermas shows
towards the colonisation of the lifeword thesis. In this warning he argues that
the rationalisation of the lifeworld “becomes so hypertrophied that it
unleashes system imperatives that burst the capacity of the lifeword they
instrumentalise”.[22]
Russell John Tully's story is not unfamiliar in our present society and
there are numerous examples where a desperate, and often mentally unstable,
individual irrationally and violently vents their anger at what they perceive
is the system that is the source of their trouble. The vicissitudinous nature
of modern institutions are no longer orientated to deal with these negative
social pathologies in a holistically constructive manner. Modernity has pulled
our social systems so far beyond our grasp we no longer recognise the humanity
in them. They have become faceless and alien to our innermost and fundamental
needs. It would appear because of our markets and bureaucracies, New Zealand is
not exempt from the colonisation of the lifeworld.
[1] Otago Daily Times Online News, "Interview reveals
suspect's desperation," Allied Press
Limited, last modified September 1, 2014, http://www.odt.co.nz/news/national/314429/interview-reveals-suspects-desperation.
[2] Sophie Ryan et al., "Ashburton Work and Income
shooting: Suspect arrested," APN New
Zealand Limited, last modified September 1, 2014,
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11317243.
[3] Otago Daily Times Online News, "Interview reveals
suspect's desperation."
[4] Andrew Edgar, Habermas: The Key Concepts (New
York: Routledge, 2006), 21.
[5] Jürgen
Habermas, "Social Action and Rationality." In On Society and
Politics, ed. Steven Seidman (Boston: Beacon, 1989), 143.
[6] ibid.,
153-7.
[7] ibid., 154.
[8] Ian
Buchanan, Oxford Dictionary of Critical Theory (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2010), 294.
[9] Jürgen Habermas, " The
Concept of the Lifeworld and Hermeneutic Idealism." In On Society and
Politics, ed. Steven Seidman (Boston: Beacon, 1989), 173.
[10] Edgar, 139.
[11] Habermas, “The Concept
of the Lifeworld.” 184-7; Habermas, "The Uncoupling of System and Lifeworld."
in On Society and Politics, ed. Steven Seidmam (Boston: Beacon, 1989),
188; For Habermas a hermeneutical approach encompasses an interpretation of the
whole social, historical, and psychological world.
[12] Habermas, “The Concept
of the Lifeworld.” 184.
[13] James Bohman,
and William Regh. "Jürgen Habermas." Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. Last modified 2014. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/habermas/.
[14] Habermas, “The Concept
of the Lifeworld.” 185.
[15] Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons, 2nd ed. (London: George
Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1976), 16; Habermas, “The Uncoupling of System and
Lifeworld.” 189.
[16] Habermas, “The
Uncoupling of System and Lifeworld.” 189.
[17] ibid.
[18] ibid., 190, 205.
[19] John Scott and Gordon Marshall, Oxford Dictionary
of Sociology, 3rd ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 630-1,
803.
[20] Bohman and Regh.
[21] Habermas, “The
Uncoupling of System and Lifeworld.” 205.
[22] ibid., 190.
———————————————————————————————————————— "... we can explore space together, both inner and outer, forever in peace." —W. M. Hicks.
