An Application of Utilitarian Moral Theory to the Well-being of Future People

“… I know this steak doesn't exist. I know that when I put it in my mouth, the Matrix is telling my brain that it is juicy and delicious. After nine years, you know what I realize?
 … Ignorance is bliss.”

Cypher, The Matrix.[1]

At the twilight of the twentieth century The Wachowski Brothers sparked our philosophical imagination by positing a terrible future that involved a virtual reality that was imposed on humanity by a self-aware system of complex machinery. Their film, The Matrix, challenged us to think about what we want our future to be like and whether is it morally acceptable for us to impose a morally dubious world on those in the distant future. The Wachowski Brothers’ film also challenges to think about our obligations to future people and if we have any. One of our greatest present moral challenges, anthropogenic climate change, is a moral issue that questions our obligations to future people and their well-being. In determining our obligations to future people, especially with regards to large scale and far reaching public and economic policy that affects the environmental scale of climate change, it can be difficult to see what these obligations are with respect to their well-being. This essay however, is not an epistemological argument regarding the validity of anthropogenic climate change theories.[2] A myriad of peer-reviewed scientific evidence has proven beyond doubt the causes and consequences of climate change.[3] Rather, this essay will focus on our moral responsibility to responding to the human consequences of climate change. This will be done by linking the future well-being of people with our moral obligations to climate change. Obligations aside, it is firstly difficult to define what exactly constitutes as well-being for humans. A substantive and conclusive moral understanding of what well-being is would be a key component in understanding our obligations to future generations thus highlighting the morally correct public policy choices that will safeguard their future well-being.

Defining well-being has been a difficult exercise for philosophers for thousands of years; from Aristotle's concept of Eudaimonia to Jeremy Bentham's unit of pleasure, the hedon. Tim Mulgan has argued that well-being can not be easily linked exclusively to either happiness or welfare as this gives rise to objections and intuitively negative implications.[4] Happiness has the implication being linked to pleasure; but not all pleasures are empirically constitutive of what could be regarded as well-being. The consumption of drugs or alcohol may bring temporary pleasure but overuse will create negative health effects that most would agree would be detrimental to well-being. Welfare is unnecessarily tied to material wealth. Monetary value, although easily measurable, is not explicitly an indicator of well-being either. A person on a modest income could be a picture of health whereas a multi-millionaire could over-indulge in fatty foods or suffer from a lack of meaningful personal social relationships. These do not capture what our intuition tells us what well-being is. What is constituent of well-being is what is regarded as intrinsically valuable; a value that is not merely instrumental for human lives but valuable in itself.[5] This essay will approach theories of well-being from an rule-utilitarian perspective. Utilitarianism posits that the correct moral choices are those that create the greatest happiness for the greatest number, whereas rule-utilitarianism argues that the correct moral choices are the creation of institutional rules (or in our case public policy choices) that bring about the greatest happiness for the greatest number.[6]

Classical utilitarianism regards hedonism, the presence of pleasure and the absence of pain, as the only intrinsically valuable constituent of human well-being.[7] A hedonist public policy would seek to ensure the augmentation of pleasure for the greatest number. The difficulties hedonism faces are its subjectivity as well as its phenomenological implications. John Stuart Mill refined Bentham's original concept of pleasure with higher and lower pleasures.[8] Mill sought to define higher and lower pleasures with competent judges, something that immediately manifests thoughts of subjectivity as well as paternalism. Robert Nozick has argued against a hedonistic view of well-being by saying pleasure is not the only intrinsically valuable aspect of human lives. Nozick proposed a thought experiment that speaks to our intuition and challenges us to reject hedonism. His "Experience Machine", which one had the choice to plug into or not, consisted of a kind of virtual reality that was phenomenologically indifferent from reality. Its user could choose any experience possible from being a successful athlete to completing a great novel. But the intuitions of those who reject the Experience Machine suggest that there are more valuable aspects to human experience than purely sensuous experience. A rejection of the Experience Machine suggests that we need a greater connection with reality; we want our experiences to be genuine.[9] Another possible objection to hedonism is similar to the aforementioned objection to a welfarist, or monetary, conception of well-being. Not all pleasures are positive: consumption of certain foods, alcohol, or drugs bring temporally brief sensuous pleasures but in excess would detrimentally affect a person’s health and therefore well-being. The same could be said of sadistic pleasures one might acquire from morally objectionable activities such as torture or rape—psychologically these would be detrimental if they were regarded to be constituent of well-being.

Nozick, however, is not rejecting an individual's right to choose the Experience Machine, but is deferring to an individual the choice rather than insisting the machine as a hedonist would. This leads us to the second utilitarian conception of well-being, preference theory, which regards an individual's right to choose what they prefer as the only intrinsically valuable aspect of human well-being.[10] The utilitarian approach to preference theory would seek to maximise the opportunities for preferential moral decisions for the greatest number. This theory posits that the only morally acceptable way for people to decide well-being is have them decide for themselves. The theory is popular with libertarians such as Nozick, because of the emphasis of individual free choice, as well as economists because it is easily measured—a stronger preference for a resource or commodity will elicit a higher price therefore show that that particular item is more preferred for an individual's well-being.[11] Public policy choices in this regard would cater to an individual's preferences and thus avoid any accusations of paternalism. Preference theory however faces similar problems to hedonism: preference is also subjective and can be based on uninformed choices or ignorance of consequences. Preference theory can also unfortunately be linked with monetary power and therefore return the measure of well-being to mere monetary terms rather than something with objective moral significance; the implication that the preferences of affluent European or North American choices have more moral worth than those of Latin American or African choices seems, intuitively, to not grasp the concept of well-being. The aggressive commodification of all aspects of life in capitalist economies would have more worth to well-being within preference theory than the self-sustainability of communal pre-industrial economies because of mere monetary value—something itself which is instinctively Eurocentric.

The final theory to be addressed, objective-list, takes a different approach to well-being than the subjectivism of hedonism and preference theory. Objective-list theory presupposes a list of items that are intrinsically, as well as objectively, valuable to human well-being.[12] These items are based on the independent value of each item rather than a preference for each item; this creates a desire based on value rather than value based on desire.[13] The list might include items such as: healthy food and water; appropriate clothing and shelter from the elements; positive family and social relationships; opportunities for education and knowledge; opportunities for exercise and physical activity; freedom from fear and intimidation; the right to personal expression. These are just some of the basics that might be included on a list. Many objectivists might also encompass the above theories by including positive pleasures and the ability to exercise preferences, however, these are not the only intrinsically valuable constituents of what well-being is.

Objective-list theory relies on empirically measurable proxies for constituent items.[14] For example, a comprehensive analysis of health would include, but not be limited to, data concerning rates of disease, mortality, obesity, or mental illness. A utilitarian approach to objective-list would attempt to augment the positive aspects in subsequent data for the greatest number, such as lowering rates of disease or increasing access to healthy food. An advantage objective-list offers over hedonist and preference theories are that it is less risk-averse at both an individual and societal level. An adherence to an objectively measurable standard of well-being is less likely to encounter the shortcomings of hedonism and preference theory; individuals and societies are no longer subject to an arbitrary blissful ignorance when it comes to moral choices concerning their needs. This is especially critical in determining our moral obligations to future people, more of which will be outlined below.

The obvious objection objective-list theory immediately faces is accusations of paternalism. Why should I be told what is good for me? This makes individuals subject to somebody else’s, often elitist, concept of what well-being is. Certain individuals might not feel an obligation to adhere to a preconceived notion of what is good for them; it takes away individuals’ faculties to rationally choose for themselves what they determine to be adequate for the well-being of their own lives. Why should an individual not choose Nozick’s Experience Machine if for them it would make them better off? Objective-list seems to trample on individual freedoms; something most, if not all, people value intrinsically, even if some choices may be detrimental. The idea of being coerced into living a certain way we have been told that it is for our own good seems, intuitively, to make us anxious. There is also difficulty in determining what exactly goes on the list and where the list stops; any preconceived list is inevitably arbitrarily subject to its author’s bias. It might also be less palatable if the author’s list reflects affluent conceptions of well-being. Objective-list is just as at risk of accusations of subjectivity as hedonism or preference theories.

Despite these objections to an objective conception of well-being it is a more suitable moral theory for determining our obligations to future people. Subjective theories breakdown and produce undesirable consequences temporally, especially when present moral choices drastically affect the well-being of future people. Mulgan has given more impetus to Nozick’s Experience Machine to demonstrate this; a further thought experiment called the Virtual Future. Mulgan’s thought experiment is similar to Nozick’s in the sense that a virtual reality phenomenologically indifferent to an actual reality is projected onto its user. Where it differs, is that the Virtual Future is an alternative to a broken world: a world so damaged by the effects of human activity that it becomes almost uninhabitable; it is a simultaneously shared user experience within the virtual world (Mulgan does not mention what portion of the population is engaged in the Virtual Future machine but it is likely that its use would elicit a significant expense); every user is aware the reality projected on them is false but they are also aware that it is preferable to their actual reality; finally, this is not a reality chosen by its users but imposed on them by a past generation of people.[15]

To demonstrate that objective-list theory is the best moral theory regarding both our obligations of future people as well as our obligations to responses to climate change Mulgan’s Virtual Future thought experiment could be approached both literally and metaphorically. Each well-being theory and its implications must be tested to provoke our intuitive response. A literal interpretation of the Virtual Future that is not unlike the aforementioned film The Matrix, in the sense that it presupposes that humanity in the future has indeed somehow destroyed their natural environment beyond repair, that the technology exists to create (or more disturbingly, impose) an artificial reality for humanity, and the virtual reality appears to be better for humanity than the reality of their actual world. The choice faced by a present generation of people is to decide not for themselves but for their descendants whether or not to impose this virtual reality on them: a choice between a broken reality and blissful ignorance. Hedonist and preference theories would no doubt be useful in providing a better, albeit false, reality for future generations but distorts what we value phenomenologically. It is forcing us to make a difficult choice where either option makes us uncomfortable. Our imposition of a Virtual Future is an easy option to avoid obligations as well as a disturbing manipulation of the intrinsic values of future generations.[16]

It is another, metaphorical, interpretation of the Virtual Future thought experiment that evokes our intuitive reaction to outright dismiss subjective moral theories regarding obligations to future generations. Mulgan’s thought experiment teases our train of thought back to the reality of the actual situation humanity faces: a choice between the imposition of the chaotic effects of climate change on humanity or a mitigation of these effects to a liveable environment—a decision that its recipients have to live with but have absolutely no say in effecting. This is where subjective moral theories break down. There is an unbridgeable gap between the desires of present people and the desires future people (it becomes more apparent when subsequent generations no longer overlap the present generation and as the effects of climate change become increasingly drastic). If the present generation desires to defer costly responses to environmental disaster for the sake of economic growth they fail, temporally, to meet the desires of future generations. Future generations would desire the same natural environment and all its benefits we enjoy here in the present (or past) over a destroyed environment especially if they had been given the choice. It is this imposition where better choices could have been made that seems morally disturbing in the sense that present choices are both arbitrary and naïvely authoritarian across time as well as space. Unfortunately, future people cannot make present decisions and this forces us to rethink our moral responsibilities in the present to objectively capture what is intrinsically valuable to well-being across time as well as space. If we think about our list of objectively valuable items, many of which preference theorists would agree would contribute to their well-being, it is almost certain that an irrevocably damaged environment would fail to provide many of these items or a the very least make them very difficult to provide. Only an application of objective-list theory is congruent in transmitting what is intrinsically valuable across time. If we are genuinely concerned about fulfilling the well-being of future people we must abandon temporally myopic subjective moral theories that are imposing with regard to our responses to anthropogenic climate change.

The subjective-objective dichotomy is often contentious in moral philosophy, and subjective moral theories can certainty accommodate individuality in many circumstances in the present where present people are affected. But it is this subjectivity that has dangerous implications when applied to moral decisions for future people. Subjective moral theories exponentially fail to be conductive across time. The idea that our moral subjectivity can impose drastic consequences for future generations is deeply unnerving. Anybody who was born into undesirable conditions where the decisions regarding those circumstances were self-regarding (inter-generational rather than inter-personal) expresses some regret towards their ancestors. If we genuinely believe that it is our moral obligation to leave future generations better off than the present generation it is imperative that we adopt an objective account of what human well-being is. Only then can our present decisions regarding climate change policy aim to meet the well-being of our descendants without being bogged down in the myopia of trivial present pursuits.

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[1]  Joe Pantoliano, The Matrix. Motion picture. Directed by The Wachowski Brothers. United States: Warner Bros. Pictures, 1999.

[2] For the purpose of this essay any mention of climate change can be regarded as anthropogenic i.e. caused by human activity.

[3] Jim Salinger, ed. Living in a Warmer World: How a Changing Climate Will Affect Our Lives, (Collingwood, Victoria: CSIRO Publishing, 2013), 10-2.

[4] Tim Mulgan, Ethics for a Broken World: Imagining Philosophy After Catastrophe (Montreal, Québec: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2011), 100.

[5] ibid., 101.

[6] Simon Blackburn, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 388.

[7] Roger Crisp. "Well-Being," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Accessed April 11, 2014, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/well-being/.

[8] John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, On Liberty and Considerations on Representative Government, (London, UK: Everyman's Library, 1984), 10-1.

[9] Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 42-5.

[10] Mulgan, Ethics for a Broken World, 104.

[11] ibid., 111.

[12] Crisp, “Well-being”.

[13] Mulgan, Ethics for a Broken World, 108.

[14] ibid., 111.

[15] Tim Mulgan, "Ethics for Possible Futures," in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, (London: The Aristotelian Society, 2014), 7-9.

[16] ibid., 10.

———————————————————————————————————————— "... we can explore space together, both inner and outer, forever in peace." —W. M. Hicks.

Refugees, Referenda, and The Rugby-Industrial Complex

Looking back over this past week in politics, I struggle to find the words to describe my feelings towards the messy, incomprehensible, variegated swirl of events that have taken place. It's as if someone has pulled out that box in my cognition that processes events and deciphers them so the can be analysed at a later date and replaced it with a meat mincer. But is this just me, or is it the bizarre mix that has gone into it? In order to process what has possibly become the farcical peak of the Fifth National Government, it is going to need a rigorous break-down of its almost paradoxical parts.

Anybody who knows me personally, knows that my interest in rugby has waned to the point of oblivion over the last ten years. I can't remember the last time I watched a full game (perhaps the the 2011 World Cup final, but even then it was work, as I was a technician in the corporate audio-visual industry at the time—so that wasn't of my own choice). Firstly, it's not that I have anything against rugby per se, or even sport in general, but I just don't find it that interesting. I'm an odd person out: I don't mind cricket, in fact, I wish I had more time to watch cricket, but I just don't like rugby that much anymore. Secondly, and more importantly, I loath the ubiquity of the hyper-commercialised, hyper-masculine, alcohol soaked, and now politicised nature the game has become. I'm sure there are other sports worldwide that get the same treatment, but, what I'm going to call the Rugby-Industrial Complex, has become unique to New Zealand. I've derived this terminology from Dwight Eisenhower's warning to Americans in 1961 of a military-industrial complex that has since derailed the American political system. Eisenhower described the monetary relationship between legislators, the military, and the arms industry. Thankfully, New Zealand doesn't have such a war-mongering culture, but the political ties between rugby and the National Government are almost certainly discernible.

It was Robert Muldoon's National Government that insisted in 1981 that the national rugby team of a country that had openly racist and oppressive policies should not be stopped from touring in New Zealand because, obviously, sport and politics don't mix. Sure, different nations can come together at the Olympic games and compete for the spirit of the game, but below that semblance of unity there are often deep tensions and political motives. Why do all the rich countries win more medals? Surely sporting talent can arise anywhere on the globe? It was Aristotle that said man (just man) was, and still is, a fundamentally political animal. There is no way to completely depoliticise sport, just like every other action anyone takes, the motives for that action are linked to your moral principles, and hence, your political principles. The relationship the 1981 National Government had with rugby is one of convenience, just like the present National Government. Muldoon didn't want to upset his rural rugby-loving, liberal-hating constituents. To Muldoon, the tour wasn't going to become a political football—but in performing that do nothing approach it inherently was still politicised.

Fast-forward three decades and that switched has been flipped in its opposite direction, but as aforementioned, the relationship is a relationship of convenience. I'm not going to go terribly in-depth with the events of the 2011 Rugby World Cup because they have been highly publicised and scrutinised. But suffice to say, that is when the Rugby-Industrial Complex reached maturity. What other country has a Rugby World Cup minister? How about that awful political point scoring three-way handshake? As we descend on another traffic-stopping tournament the Rugby-Industrial Complex is stoking its boilers and exercising its political muscle. The rugby and politics train collided head-on on Sunday when John Key opened Parliament especially for the announcement of the 2015 World Cup Team. For the "sport and politics don't mix" attitude this seems the be a juxtaposition. This is the Key Government putting the spotlight on themselves as just as rugby-mad as the rest of New Zealand rather than on the mounting political failures of late. Also, I can't remember the last time there was so much media attention given to the players that didn't even make the team. Are we that obsessed?

Yet again, the telling influence of the Rugby-Industrial Complex has shown its ugly side this week with the bill rushed through Parliament allowing bars to be open at the early hours of the morning to coincide with games in the United Kingdom. I'm sure the political-business ties are many and numerous between the hospitality industry, alcohol companies, Sky TV, and the National Party. But would I, along with many others, be a killjoy by pointing this out? No, because it just seems so bizarre that this event gets such special treatment—and inevitably this is just the result of our socially destructive hyper-masculine, drinking, homophobic, rape culture. Will the roastbusters team be out during the world cup picking up drunk and vulnerable women? Why this event and not any other? Why do we need to drink to be a part of, or enjoy sport? Surely the unhealthy habits of binge drinking seem oxymoronic to the athleticism of rugby? This is obviously a complex relationship—again, a relationship of convenience—that runs deep and what I've mentioned is just food, or should I say drink, for thought.

This other week's farcical political sideshow was the dreaded flag referendum. Apologists for the referendum often suggest the $26 million spend is a drop in the bucket; welfare costs billions. Never mind that gutting the modern welfare state would be turning back the clock to the social Darwinism of Victorian Britain. However, Key was unequivocal in his reluctance to spend $9 million on the citizens' initiated referendum on the partial sale of important public assets. I'm sure the Taxpayer's Union had a collective moan at the money spent on the referendum whose result was arrogantly ignored. You'd think a referendum initiated by the people would set a democratic percent and warrant somewhat more budget attention. But this shinning example of direct democracy didn't suit the ideologically blindfolded agenda of a cynical and fundamentally anti-democratic government. Again, a relationship of convenience. Apologists will chime that this is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to have a collective say in the future of our nation. But this horribly misses the mark. There was largely collective disgust or apathy when selection panel released its top forty flag choice, which was repeated again more vehemently with this week's release of the final four. It's quite clearly a politically motivated distraction and carefully planned money waster when the Prime Minister's pet flag appears in the top four. It might to interesting to follow any ties Kyle Lockwood has to the National Party and the Prime Minister. Again, the Rugby-Industrial Complex rears its head again when three of the four final designs feature the silver fern. Which is why I find it so perplexing that the NZRU is threatening legal action regarding the silver fern. Perhaps there will be some golden handshake for the boys at the NZRU courtesy of the tax payers. The National Government is not exactly averse to hook-ups for the boys.

As John Oliver has shown, the entire process has descended into internationally embarrassing farcical levels. Given most public opinion polls, people don't want this political pet project shoved down their throats. But no, the fruitcake-of-a sideshow must go on because it's democratic. Also, how exactly is having a say in the primary symbolic representation of our nation having a say in its future? It's akin to spending more time worrying about what colour tie to wear at a job interview than rehearsing answers to questions one might be potentially asked. One is quite clearly more relevant to your future economic outcomes than the other. We can have a politically sanctioned say in jingoistic semiotics, but how dare we have a say in the fundamental structures of political economy. It's the scraps of democracy left over for the masses from meal of the political and economic elites.

Finally, I move on to this week's equally farcical, but tragic event: the unfolding humanitarian crisis in Europe and the Middle East, and the New Zealand Government's morally vacuous response to it. They haven't lost their moral compass, no, they just threw it on the ground and stomped on it. There is a vicious hypocrisy appearing when earlier this year Key verbally insulted Andrew Little's carefully considered stance on sending New Zealand troops to Iraq by telling him to "get some guts". Despite our pittance contribution that could very well be ineffectual given the massive corruption in the Iraqi military and the surrender-inducing tactics of ISIL, Key insisted it was our moral duty, which was later revised to the payment for being part of the club—the FVEY alliance. How can we have this sycophantic behaviour but turn a blind eye to the other, inconvenience of the war—refugees? But the rugby mentality runs deep: it is more righteous to go to war, fight, and die than deal with the consequences. I can understand the response to criticism of such a woeful quota. Taking refugees does require money and infrastructure. But surely the quota could be doubled all for the cost of a flag-referendum? It is almost soul crushing nihilism that this government will rush to support legislation to extend public drinking hours for the Rugby-Industrial Complex but will not rush to support legislation for our moral duty to humanity. The same could be said for the $11 million paid to a disgruntled Saudi businessman; the same theocratic kingdom that has carried out hundreds of brutal public executions this year alone. There is some something horribly askew when we can throw money away at some quixotic sheep-deal in a nation that is not discernibly different from ISIL. The National Government had the audacity to claim that although they disagree with their human rights record, the Saudi judicial system is legislatively sanctioned and therefore legitimate. This is possibly one the most weakly ignorant arguments to grovel to a nation whose judicial system is medieval. The Third Reich in Germany from 1933 to 1945 was legislatively sanctioned as was the Final Solution at the Wansee Conference in 1942. The refugees from war-torn Europe were accommodated in New Zealand including our Prime Minister's mother. Imagine if New Zealand had not opened its doors. Also, we are not talking about immigration, we are talking about people fleeing for their lives. Surely when the morality of life or death is involved the initial concern is more pressing and the financial considerations become secondary. But the National Party does not think like this: its moral concerns are subjugated to the market, the primary moral reality. This is most certainly obvious when it comes to workplace health and safety legislation; that horrible red tape that actually stops people losing life and limb is not morally more important than letting the market do its invisible hand thing. As a myriad of commentators have already said, its time this government got some guts.

This is just scratching the surface of the beat-your-head-against-a-wall train wreak that is not just a third term National Government, no this is something truly spectacular, a third term Key government. A government run by ideological obsessive free-market fanatics that paint themselves as politically pragmatic with their Crosby-Textor spin-doctors. But in time the paint wears thin, and eventually the people will see the shoddy woodwork below. The social and culture rhetoric might be centre-right, but the fundamental structures of political economy are on a death-march to the far-right, surely, but slowly, where money talks, and morals walk.

———————————————————————————————————————— "... we can explore space together, both inner and outer, forever in peace." —W. M. Hicks.